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FACULTY FOCUS 
THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE INCREDIBLE 
SHRINKING FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
by Professor Bruce G. Berner 
The following is an abridged version 
of the Inaugural Lecture delivered by 
Professor Bruce Berner. An in-depth 
article, based on the lecture, will be 
published in volume 24 of the 
Valparaiso University Law Review. 
INTRODUCTION 
The fourth amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution poses two 
substantive questions about 
governmental searching. The first, 
"What is a search?", might be called 
the amendment's "reach" and could 
be restated, "What general type of 
governmental activity is this 
amendment interested in scrutinizing 
and regulating?" The second and 
logically subsequent question--"Which 
searches are unreasonable?"--might 
be termed the amendment's "grasp" 
and could be restated: "From this 
universe of 'searches', which are 
permitted and which prohibited?" It 
is, after all, only "unreasonable" 
searches that the constitution 
prohibits. 
The fourth-amendment "reach" 
cases are today in wild disarray and 
the subject of widespread attack. The 
thesis of today's lecture is that the 
disarray, while it is particularly 
notorious because of recent 
decisions, springs from the fact that 
the Supreme Court has never 
formulated a coherent test for 
"reach." It has, instead, historically 
confused the "reach" and "grasp" 
problems. While this confusion has 
generated decisions which are 
profoundly odd, it has done far 
worse--it has assured that many 
potential governmental abuses 
cannot, without starting from scratch 
on the "reach" formulation, be 
correctly decided absent legislative 
intervention. While commentators 
for the most part agree (and I do 
too) that the Supreme Court is 
answering the question wrong, I 
argue in this lecture that the 
problem is deeper--the Court is 
answering the wrong question. 
14 
A. The Current Reach Formulation 
1. Description 
The fourth amendment provides, 
in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; 
(There is a second clause about 
warrants and probable cause, but it 
has nothing to do with "reach" and 
at the "grasp" level is wholly 
subservient to the cited clause.) 
Prior to 1967, this cited language 
prompted the Court to apply two 
tests for reach. One focused on 
place and one on governmental 
activity. The Court required that 
both hurdles be jumped before it 
would address the reasonableness 
question. The fust hurdle--"Does 
the case involve a place the fourth 
amendment is concerned with?"--is 
typified by Hester v. United States, a 
case which held that any amount of 
governmental seeking in an "open 
field," property of the defendant 
outside the house's protection, could 
not be a "search." The second 
hurdle--"Did the police engage in the 
type of activity that the amendment 
means to scrutinize?"--is typified by 
Olmstead v. United States, which held 
that police eavesdropping from one 
hotel room to the next with a 
detectaphone (a device that does not 
physically penetrate the wall) was 
not a search because it entailed no 
physical trespass. Thus, until 1967, 
there was no fourth-amendment 
debate until the police trespassed 
into a relatively short list of 
''protected places." 
In United States v. Katz (1967) 
the polestar "reach" case, qefendant 
was making a phone call from a 
glass-enclosed public pay telephone. 
Federal police attached an electronic 
device to the top of the booth and 
recorded the conversation which 
became evidence in Katz's trial under 
federal gambling laws. The Court 
rejected both halves of its old "reach" 
doctrine. First, as to place, it 
rejected "persons, houses, papers and 
effects" as being an exclusive list of 
protected places and treated those 
words as merely evocative of places 
where the privacy interest is most 
keenly felt. It broadened the "place" 
part of reach to all places where a 
person has an "actual and reasonable 
expectation of privacy." The Katz 
expansion of constitutional 
protection fits nicely with other 
decisions of the liberal Warren 
Court, in full sail by 1967. Having 
formulated this "reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy" test, the 
Court then held it reasonable to 
expect that private phone 
conversations, even when made in a 
public phone booth, are not being 
surreptitiously recorded. As to the 
police activity side, the Court stated 
that, given the state of technology, 
one need not identify a trespass to 
ftnd a search. What did the Court 
replace trespass with? Nothing. The 
idea of measuring "reach" by looking 
at the police and their activities 
dropped out of the analysis for all 
practical purposes. The whole 
question regarding "reach" now 
focuses on place. Which places? 
All places in which a person 
entertains a "reasonable expectation 
of privacy." This focus is on the 
citizen--not on the government. 
But, as I hope to demonstrate, 
taking one's eyes off the government 
when doing fourth-amendment 
jurisprudence is a dangerous game. 
The opportunity the Court 
missed in Katz occurred immediately 
after it held that "persons, houses, 
papers and effects" was not an 
exclusive list of protected places but 
rather that privacy interests may exist 
in countless places and contexts. 
Once it said that, the Court could 
have noticed that it was now 
analyzing the Constitutional text as if 
it read: 
The right of the people to be 
secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; 
All that would have remained, 
therefore, would be to defme what 
"search" meant in terms of 
governmental activity. Instead, the 
Court, loathe to remove all place 
limitation, reworked the place side 
with a vaguer but self-consciously 
CULTY FOCUS 
formulation--all places where 
a "reasonable expectation of 
. · But why limit fourth-
:nent protection to any place, 
·r broadly defined? Why not 
t such protection goes with all 
to all places at all times? 
must concede that a public 
ITords less privacy than a 
But privacy in general is not 
rth amendment's concern. Its 
_.....-:-..,........" is freedom from 
;;;::~;enable searches and seizures, 
m which is not sensibly 
..:r:lm&TJibed by time or place. A 
rr.an can, to be sure, properly 
a great deal about us when 
in a public place. This is 
-ever, because the fourth 
':nent should not apply in a 
place, but because his 
:ations in public places are 
likely to be unreasonable. 
rs note: At this point, the 
lation is tested against ten fact 
· ns - some are decided cases, 
hypo theticals.] 
luation 
·reasonable expectation of 
formulation is, I believe, the 
question to be asking wholly 
from the matter of whether or 
1:: Court is doing a good job of 
ring it (It isn't.) The Court 
by this formulation into 
of lWO unpleasant postures, and 
emonstrate it has adopted 
either it must simply conclude 
de force that given 
Lions are unreasonable or it 
ffer logical support. Let us 
"-:e some of the justifications 
Co n has offered 
e Analogy to Private Citizens 
Court, as we have seen in 
t section, often invokes images 
general public, the "curious 
rsby," the flying public, or a 
..---.""'""~te for the public (neighbors, 
example) to find expectations of 
• unreasonable. It is 
ting to note how this analogy 
and goes in the cases. 
imes we hear about these folks 
and sometimes we do not; often the 
reason we do not is that these folks, 
should they do what the police have 
done, would be committing torts or 
crimes. Of course the curious 
passerby may glance, even 
purposefully look, into a house from 
the sidewalk. But if he begins 
walking through "open fields," 
looking in buildings, and digging up 
the earth, he will need a good 
lawyer. He could fly over your 
property, but if he stakes you out 
with binoculars and startrons, he 
might be liable in tort for "invasion 
of privacy" or "outrage" and 
prosecutable criminally under 
Peeping-Tom Statutes. 
When doing constitutional 
jurisprudence, references to the 
legality or illegality of actions of 
private citizens are usually beside the 
point. Tort law and criminal law, 
among others, restrain private action. 
The Constitution restrains state 
action. This latter restraint is 
sometimes more than the former, 
sometimes less. If a policeman 
breaks into a house and seizes drugs, 
this is a search and seizure testable 
under the fourth amendment. If a 
private citizen were to do the same 
thing, he would commit burglary and 
theft. The fact that a private citizen 
may or may not lawfully engage in a 
given action is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to conclude that a 
policeman may or may not do that 
same act for a governmental 
purpose. 
b. The "intimate activities" argument 
In its decision in Riley (a case in 
which the police hovered over the 
defendant's back yard in a helicopter 
to look into a greenhouse that was 
not visible from street level, and 
identified marijuana from a height of 
400 feet), the Court notes: "As far 
as thiS record reveals, no intimate 
details connected with the use of the 
home or curtilage were observed .... " 
The Pennsylvania startron case (in 
which the police staked out 
defendant's third-floor apartment 
from an apartment across the street 
for nine days, and who, with the aid 
of binoculars and a startron [an 
infrared device which enhances 
capacity to see into low light areas], 
witnessed persons other than the 
defendant engage in sexual activity) 
indeed seems to turn not on what 
the policeman did, but on what he 
saw. But with all due respect, how 
can one sensibly judge whether or 
not activity is a search by reference 
to what is observed? If police break 
into your house and find nothing, 
have they not been searching? Have 
you not suffered the intrusion? This 
kind of retrospective reasoning is like 
saying that all events which happen 
were perforce "foreseeable." Or even 
"inevitable." I cannot imagine how a 
person's right to privacy can, without 
compromising the very idea of 
privacy, be rationally made to turn 
on what he does with it. The fourth 
amendment prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures not because 
they may yield results but because, 
regardless of their yield, they are 
improper intrusions. 
c. The Policeman's Location 
Because the Katz question is 
framed in terms of the expectations 
of the homeowner to be free from 
outside intrusion, the focus of the 
recent cases is, as we have seen, on 
where the policeman is located 
rather than on what he sees (or 
hears, etc.) into. Note the irony: 
the "reasonable expectation" rubric, 
an approach by which the Warren 
Court self-consciously selected the 
"protected-place" rather than the 
"police-activity" perspective, ends up 
under the Burger-Rehnquist courts 
concentrating on where the 
policeman is physically located rather 
than on what place he intrudes 
upon! To the extent the Court 
now focuses on where a policeman 
"has a right to be" and not on what 
he has a "right to view," something 
akin to the old trespass requirement 
is back with a vengeance--the 
policeman needs only to justify his 
location, which is often outside any 
protected area. And today, of 
course, there are considerably more 
tools to intrude on people's privacy 
without physically trespassing into 
"protected areas." 




The pre-Katz notion that "reach" 
was a function of two perspectives--
place and kind of activity--was 
attacked head on by Professor 
Anthony Amsterdam. Referring to 
Katz, he stated: 
If the word "intrusion" is 
used, as "violated" plainly 
was, to mean only that 
interests protected have 
been defeated by the 
"Government's activities," I 
have no quarrel with it. 
The problem with the word 
lies in its subtle suggestion 
that a particular kind or 
sort of government activity, 
labeled an "intrusion," is 
necessary to trigger the 
fourth amendment. But 
this, in my view, was 
precisely the approach to 
fourth amendment coverage 
that Katz decisively rejected. 
My argument is that this is precisely 
the approach that Katz decisively 
missed. Professor Amsterdam 
continued: 
The entire thrust of the 
opinion is that it is needless 
to ask successively whether 
an individual has the kind of 
interest that the fourth 
amendment protects and 
whether that interest is 
invaded by a kind of 
governmental activity 
characterizable by its 
attributes as a "search." 
Rather, a "search" is 
anything that invades 
interests protected by the 
amendment. 
I agree with Professor Amsterdam 
that there should be one test for 
"reach," not two, but I suggest that 
the Court in Katz chose the wrong 
one. If we follow Professor 
Amsterdam's suggestion that a 
search is "anything that invades 
interests protected by the [fourth] 
amendment," we must next identify 
those interests. If we attempt to 
defme them broadly as "privacy, 
security, liberty," the definition 
includes many interests protected by 
other constitutional guarantees, by 
statutes, by common law, and some 
interests not protected at all. 
"Privacy"--what Justice Brandeis 
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called "the most comprehensive ... 
and the most valued by civilized 
men," the "right to be let alone"--is a 
constellation of interests protected, 
in its various forms, by the first 
amendment provisions dealing with 
association and religion, the third 
amendment on troop quartering, the 
fifth-amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, and the ninth 
amendment retained-rights clause, 
not to mention those privacy-
centered interests, like birth-control 
information, which have been found 
"emanating" and/or "penumbrating" 
from the Constitution's text. By the 
time we cull out these other aspects 
of privacy, the "interest" underlying 
the fourth amendment is to be free 
from uninvited governmental 
intrusions. The fourth amendment 
"interest" is, in short, to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
If we then turn around and define a 
"search" as "anything which defeats 
this interest," we could be indicted 
on suspicion of felonious question-
begging. 
Rather than defme the activity in 
terms of the interest (a search is 
anything that intrudes on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy) or 
the interest in terms of activity (the 
fourth amendment protects those 
places we want free from intrusion), 
I propose that we defme the 
governmental activity in iJs own 
terms--that we take the word "search" 
to mean what it means. Pretty 
radicaL My test for "reach" is as 
follows: to search is physically to 
seek through any of the senses for a 
governmental purpose, including, of 
course, crime detection. 
I anticipate the following general 
objection to my proposal that 
"search" be defined as "any physical 
seeking for a governmental purpose": 
"That is entirely too broad. 
Everything a policeman does is 
searching under this definition." 
Well, not everything. But, truth is, 
police do a lot of searching. It is a 
large part of the job. However, it 
cannot be persuasively argued that 
because activity happens routinely, 
the Constitution ought take no note 
of it--indeed, it ought to be 
especially interested in it. And, of 
course, most of these searches are 
reasonable. The fourth amendment 
will "reach" them, but it will not 
"grasp" them. When they become 
unreasonable, however, the fourth 
amendment will be there to strike 
them down. 
And, at bottom, what has 
happened, I think, is this. (I trust 
you will grant me a short, political 
digression.) Using the Riley 
helicopter case as an example, the 
Court, from a reading of the entire 
record, concluded that, under the 
circumstances (including the 
anonymous tip), the police acted 
properly to detect a suspected crime. 
The Court was, therefore, 
comfortable affirming Riley's 
conviction. But it took this comfort 
born of a judgment about the 
conduct's "reasonableness" and 
translated it--because the "reach" 
doctrine is so tractable to this--into a 
finding that the police were "not 
searching." 
But what of those cases looming 
out there when the Court does not 
think the police have acted properly? 
The Court will want the 
Constitution to "grasp" these cases 
but its "reach" will be too short. 
2. Testing 
[Editors note: the proposed 
formulation is, at this point, applied 
to the same ten fact situations.] 
3. Evaluation 
The proposed "reach" formulation 
produces, I think, demonstrably 
better, more sensible, results in the 
tested cases. Its focus is on the 
police, not the vague "expectations" 
of the average citizen. It frees the 
Court to scrutinize all uninvited 
intrusions under the fourth 
amendment. 
Yet, two categories of objections 
to the proposed formulation can be 
anticipated. At the "reach" level, a 
test turning on governmental 
motivation rather than location is 
more difficult to administer. A 
person's location is often provable 
through direct evidence; his 
motivation must usually be proved 
circumstantially. Once a policeman 
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learns that certain motivations place 
his activity outside the fourth 
amendment, what prevents him from 
always claiming the innocent 
motivation? Aside from the obvious 
fact that police can attempt to 
manipulate any rule (they can lie 
now as to where they were), most of 
the police activity involved in these 
cases permit very unambiguous 
inferences about motivation. The 
law, including Constitutional law, is 
rife with instances in which a court 
must judge motivation, intent, 
premeditation, knowledge, purpose, 
belief, etc. and it accomplishes this 
task, for the most part, without 
grave difficulty. In troublesome 
areas, courts can use well-proven 
legal techniques to prevent abuse; 
the burden of proof, for example, 
can be imposed on the government 
to disprove search motivation under 
all or specified circumstances. One 
can, for example, easily imagine a 
rule which presumes a search, absent 
strong rebutting evidence, whenever 
a policeman enters a house. 
The second category of objection 
is that the proposed formulation, 
because it recognizes so many more 
"searches," places undue stress on 
the "grasp" issue--"reasonableness." 
It must be conceded that 
reasonableness doctrine will have to 
be more fmely tuned. Consider 
these observations of Professor 
Amsterdam: 
The problem with the 
graduated model, of course, 
is [that] it converts the 
fourth amendment into one 
immense Rorschach blot. 
The complaint is being 
voiced now that fourth 
amendment law is too 
complicated and confused 
for policemen to understand 
and obey. Yet present law 
is a positive paragon of 
simplicity compared to what 
a graduated fourth 
amendment would produce. 
The varieties of police 
behavior and of the 
occasions that call it forth 
are so innumerable that 
their reflection in a general 
sliding scale approach could 
only produce more slide 
than scale. 
It is often preferable, however, to 
adopt a rule which generates 
doctrinal complexity rather than one 
which simplifies a problem by 
ignoring it, especially when ignoring 
it begs abuse, and, most especially, 
when that abuse will come from the 
government. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
in fact, since Professor Amsterdam's 
cited writing, already gone a very 
long way toward instituting the 
graduated model of reasonableness. 
Current doctrine recognizes all of 
the following concepts: physical 
restraint less than a typical arrest 
(called a "stop") justified by less than 
the probable cause required for 
arrest; physical restraint more 
intrusive than a common arrest (like 
killing the arrestee, at the extreme) 
justifiable only under compelling 
circumstances; and "searches" less 
intrusive than typical ("frisks," 
magnetometer scans at airports, 
administrative searches, etc.) as well 
as those searches uncommonly 
intrusive (strip searches, body-cavity 
searches, surgery to remove evidence, 
etc.), all of which require respectively 
less or more justification than usual. 
The Court seems quite comfortable 
administering this "sliding-scale" 
approach to "reasonableness." 
I do not believe that the task of 
fitting all the new "searches" into this 
existing graduated model would be 
difficult. For example, the Court 
could quickly establish that all 
naked-eye searches from public 
streets or sidewalks are per se 
reasonable absent bizarre aggravating 
circumstances; that views into a 
house from a consenting neighbor's 
property are justifiable upon a 
showing of "reasonable suspicion"; 
that views into houses utilizing 
advanced technology and/or strategic 
location require "probable cause" 
and, perhaps, prior judicial approval. 
The varieties of police behavior may 
be innumerable, as Professor 
Amsterdam suggests, but they do 
tend to fit into broad, predictable 
categories. Despite the difficulty of 
such a task, however, it is preferable 
to burying the whole problem under 
the headstone, "No Search." 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, fourth-amendment 
analysis should begin by scrutinizing 
governmental activity to determine if 
it is the kind of activity that 
provision is concerned about. The 
amendment, insofar as it extends to 
searches, should be understood to 
"reach" any physical seeking for a 
governmental purpose. Such an 
understanding would insure that the 
Court's function as guardian of 
constitutional liberties will not be 
jeopardized by decisions which put 
the reach too short. Once reach is 
too short, other branches of 
government must act to remedy 
injustices; it is crucial to note that 
many victims of governmental abuses 
have historically not had much access 
to those other institutions. 
Under my proposal, which 
governmental searches are 
reasonable remains, as before, to be 
debated in an ongoing judicial 
discourse. The fourth amendment 
should not grasp everything it can 
reach. Indeed, the Constitution's 
reach must exceed its grasp, or 
what's a Supreme Court for? 
Professor Bruce G. Berner, EA. 
Valparaiso 1965, LL.B. Valparaiso 
1967, LL.M Yale 1978. 
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